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Abstract
Although Scandinavians are often celebrated as the vanguards of human rights and 
international law, we know little about whether courts and judges in these countries 
have embraced those international courts and conventions that they themselves 
helped establish after the Second World War. This article presents original and com-
prehensive data on three Scandinavian courts’ citation practice. It demonstrates that 
not only do Scandinavian Supreme Courts engage surprisingly little with international 
law, but also that there is great variation in the degree to which they have domesticated 
international law and courts by citing their case law. Building on this author’s previous 
research, it is argued that Norway sticks out as much more engaged internationally due 
to a solid judicial review tradition at the national level. It is also argued that Scandina-
vian legal positivism has influenced a much more reticent approach to international 
case law than would normally be expected from this region in the world.
* From 2012–2015 the author was Professor ii in Public Law at the PluriCourts Centre, at 
the University of Oslo. This research is funded by the Danish National Research Founda-
tion Grant no. dnrf105 and conducted under the auspices of the Danish National Research 
Foundation’s Centre of Excellence for International Courts (iCourts). I would like to thank 
colleagues at iCourts and Pluricourts for valuable comments to this article and to my evolv-
ing research on citations and legitimacy of ics in general over the past years. I would also like 
to thank commentators at a conference on Nordic exceptionalism at the eui in May 2016 and 
for comments at other international conferences over the past four years and of course to 
the anonymous review conducted by the njil. Most gratitude goes, however, to my research 
assistant Kristoffer Kohn Schaldemose for helping me with the collection of data and the 
designing and presentation of results and to Majka Holm for helping with the fine tuning of 
the manuscript. Any remaining faults or mistakes rest of course with me alone.
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1 Introduction
In his book Political Order and Political Decay from 2014, Francis Fukuyama 
spends quite some time on what he calls “the getting to Denmark problem”.1 
Denmark is, according to Fukuyama, an ‘idealized place’ that all countries 
should strive to come to look like and he underscores how Denmark successful-
ly made the transition from patrimonial to modern state without having rulers 
falling into the trap of mixing personal and public interests.2 The description of 
Denmark could just as well have been of the other Nordic countries. In particu-
lar, since the Second World War, the Nordic states have often been portrayed as 
“champions of international law and human rights”,3 as “moral superpowers”,4 
and as “global good Samaritans”.5 The three Scandinavian countries, Sweden, 
Denmark and Norway, together of course with their Nordic brothers, Finland 
and Iceland, are in other words examples to be followed. They have been pre-
sented (and presented themselves) as frontrunners when it comes to human 
rights, the handing over of peace prizes but also when it comes to signing up 
to international courts, international law treaties and conventions. At least this 
has been the official picture. What is much less known is that the Scandina-
vians have displayed an enormous hesitance when it comes to the frequency 
by which they have domesticated the values they themselves stand for. For 
instance, the case law of those international courts they helped set up after 
the Second World War. The research and data presented in this article try to 
document this ‘lacking domestication’ quantitatively for the first time. It also 
deciphers the differences among the three Scandinavian countries (which are 
1 F. Fukuyama, Political Order and Political Decay: From the Industrial Revolution to the Global-
ization of Democracy (Profile Books Ltd., London, 2014) pp. 40, 751.
2 Ibid., p. 41.
3 J. Christoffersen and M.R Madsen, ‘The End of Virtue? Denmark and the Boomerang of the 
Internationalisation of Human Rights’, 80:3 Nordic Journal of International Law (2011) p. 259.
4 A.S. Dahl, ‘Sweden: Once a Moral Superpower, Always a Moral Superpower?’, 26:4 Interna-
tional Journal (2006) pp. 859–908.
5 A. Brysk, Global Good Samaritans. Human Rights as Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2009).
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 significant) and gets behind the more trivial explanations of their hesitance 
and the variance among them. The research presented here is unique as it 
draws on a newly established database, which has traced citations to interna-
tional law in Danish, Swedish, and Norwegian Supreme Courts as far back as 
the 1950s. The empirical data presented shows that Norway sticks out as much 
closer to the conventional image of the Nordic states when it comes to citing 
the treaties it has signed up to and the case law of treaty-monitoring bodies. 
Sweden and Denmark do far worse falling surprisingly behind the Norwegian 
court’s domestication of international law.
The article starts off by presenting the global context in terms of an explo-
sion in international courts and international adjudication since the Second 
World War. In this period states have also accepted a general juridicalisation 
at the national level with the establishment of strong constitutional courts. 
Interestingly this evolution has not been reflected in the Nordic countries. 
After setting the stage in section 2, the article discusses and defends the theo-
retical (and methodological) claim promoted in this research, namely that the 
legitimacy of international courts and conventions can be attributed to how 
much they are cited by national judges. As the role of precedence is central 
to citation studies in general, the following section discusses the role of pre-
cedence in international law, and in relation to the Scandinavian countries6 
having a strong dualist tradition. The article then presents the data and the 
methodology behind the quantitative data set and presents some descriptive 
statistics comparing the three Scandinavian countries. Finally, the article ends 
by  discussing the differences among the three Supreme Courts by drawing 
on my own previous research on the importance of national judicial review 
for international engagement,7 as well as, the role of Scandinavian legal posi-
tivism as a possible explanatory factor for understanding the strong empha-
sis of the lawmaker and preparatory work for judges and national courts in 
Scandinavia.
6 I use Nordic and Scandinavian more or less interchangeably in this article, knowing of 
course, that the two are often distinguished.
7 See M. Wind, ‘When Parliament comes first: The Danish Concept of Democracy meets the 
European Union’, Nordic Journal of Human Rights 2 (2009) pp. 272–289; M. Wind, D.S. Martin-
sen and G.P. Rotger, ‘The Uneven Legal Push for Europe’, 10:1 European Union Politics (March 
2009) pp. 63–88; M. Wind, ‘The Nordics, the eu and the reluctance towards supranational 
judicial review’, 48:4 Journal of Common Market Studies (2010) pp. 1039–1063; J.E. Rytter and 
M. Wind, ‘In Need of Juristocracy? The Silence of Denmark in the development of European 
Law’, 9:2 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2011) pp. 470–504.
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2 The Rise of International Courts and the Lacking  
Domestication of International Law in Scandinavia
Since the first permanent international court (ic) was set up in 1922, states 
have established almost 25 international judicial bodies. Altogether four global 
courts and 20 regional courts have emerged, and many more are in the mak-
ing.8 At the same time within the past 15 years more than 150 countries around 
the world have introduced constitutional democracy defined as “democracy 
where constitutional judicial review of legislation by strong constitutional 
courts” is regarded as a corner stone.9
This is quite a dramatic global development, which is replicated (and in 
some cases even originating) in Europe where most countries, including the 
new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, have embraced German-style 
constitutional democracy in the post war period.10 Both the setting up of an in-
creasing number of ics and the establishment of strong national constitution-
al structures with significant review powers to courts can be attributed to the 
general rise and spread of international human rights after the Second World 
War. It is perhaps a bit of a paradox as Christoffersen and Madsen put it, that it 
was in Europe that the human rights convention was invented and designed11 
as we are dealing with a continent which had committed an excessive number 
of human rights atrocities during the war. It was also a continent, which after 
the war with its imperial ambitions “manipulated the very same notion [of 
human rights] limiting its applicability to a selected group of individuals and 
instrumentalized human rights as part of their self-described ‘mission civilisa-
trice’ abroad”.12
The Scandinavian countries joined the European Convention of Human 
Rights (echr) at a fairly early stage in the beginning of the 1950s. However, 
8 C. Romano, K. Alter and T. Shany (eds.), The Oxford University Press Handbook of Interna-
tional Adjudication (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013); K. Alter, The New Terrain of 
International Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014).
9 R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2004).
10 A. Stone Sweet, Governing with Judges: Constitutional Politics in Europe (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2000).
11 See E. Bates, ‘The Birth of the European Convention of Human Rights – and the European 
Court of Human Rights’, in J. Christoffersen and M. Rask Madsen (eds.), The European 
Court of Human Rights between Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011); 
M. Rask Madsen, ‘The protracted institutionalization of the Strasbourg Court: From Legal 
Diplomacy to Integrationist Jurisprudence’, in Christoffersen and Rask Madsen, ibid.
12 Christoffersen and Rask Madsen, ibid., p. 1.
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it soon became clear that the Convention was mainly for external consump-
tion and not directed at these countries themselves.13 Scandinavians such as 
Dag Hammarskjöld,14 who was a prominent figure in the United Nations (un) 
as the second secretary general from 1953–1961, came to “embody the notion 
that small states should seek to exploit international forums such as the un 
and therefore generally support the drafting of binding international law as a 
means for international peace and cooperation”.15
In other fields of the social sciences like international relations, which 
emerged as an independent discipline after the Second World War, the narra-
tive that Scandinavians had a special humanitarian approach to international 
law, human rights and peaceful coexistence also became prominent. Wæver 
and Kristensen16 argue that the Scandinavian ir discipline started out with 
a strong focus on peace studies and a deep-felt criticism of power politics – a 
fact that underscored also the academic community’s commitment to a special 
Nordic focus on peace operations, human rights and international cooperation 
in general.17 However, also here the dominant hidden assumption seemed to 
be that human rights were primarily for export and not something that the 
Scandinavians themselves needed to address. Even after the human rights 
convention was incorporated into national law in the beginning of the 1990s, 
more than 40 years (!) after it was signed, the Scandinavian countries avoided 
to fully embrace it. But what would a true domestication of human rights have 
entailed? Following Christoffersen and Madsen it would be:
taking international law down from its elevated position in terms of a uni-
versal commitment to peace and international cooperation, which had 
marked most of the 20th century Scandinavian legal internationalism, 
and instead bringing it into the everyday practice of law and politics.18
One way of “taking international law down from its elevated position” was 
for domestic courts to start citing it and thus rely on the convention and 
the  Strasbourg Court’s case law in their own decisions. Something that the 
13 Christoffersen and Rask Madsen, supra note 4, p. 258.
14 And before him, the Norwegian Trygve Halfdan Lie who was the first secretary general.
15 Christoffersen and Madsen, supra note 4, p. 259.
16 O. Wæver and P.M Kristensen, ‘Scandinavian ir – Less Identity, More Influence?’, 
forthcoming.
17 Wæver and Kristensen argue among other things that Norway is the country in the world 
with the largest number of ir scholars signing up to liberalism.
18 Christoffersen and Madsen, supra note 4, p. 258.
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 Scandinavian courts have turned out to be very hesitant to do – even today. 
Fig. 1, which is generated from an iCourts database collecting citations from all 
European courts, illustrates that the Nordic countries’ courts are among those 
least likely to cite the oldest and most well-known human rights court in the 
world: the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).
Neglecting those international court-decisions that your own government 
has signed up to by not citing them is a rather clear statement as we are to see 
below.
However, it was not only the domestication of human rights and interna-
tional law that never really penetrated the Scandinavian countries. It was also 
the general idea of constitutionalism. Apart from Norway, which actually ad-
opted a constitutional court with rather strong review functions already in 
1866,19 Denmark and Sweden preserved strong parliaments and no constitu-
tional courts. The Supreme Courts of the latter two democracies have over the 
years conducted no or only very weak constitutional review.
In Denmark it has only happened once in 170 years that the Supreme Court 
has set aside a piece of legislation adopted by parliament. It was in the case 
19 See A. Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously: The Case of Norway (Oslo University Press, 
Oslo, 2014) p. 6.
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of the Tvind law in 1999, which was considered unconstitutional.20 In Sweden 
judicial review was explicitly forbidden in the Constitution until 1979 and is 
even today significantly limited.21
The same goes for Finland where constitutional review was forbidden until 
2000.22 The mantra has thus been ‘no one over or above the parliament’ in 
the Nordic countries23 – a mantra that is still highly dominant in the public 
discourse. Following the distinction between constitutional and majoritar-
ian democracies presented by legal philosopher Ronald Dworkin this means 
that the Scandinavian countries – perhaps with the important exception of 
Norway – can be categorised as majoritarian democracies.24 More specifically, 
what characterises a majoritarian (as opposed to constitutional) democracy 
is exactly that there is no tradition25 for conducting judicial (constitutional) 
review by courts and that the vision of the majority in parliament (elevated 
above the other branches of government) holds strong.26 The point that I am 
20 J.P. Christensen, Domstolene – den tredje statsmagt (Aarhus Universitets forlag, Aarhus, 
2003).
21 J. Nergelius, ‘Judicial review in Swedish law’, 27:2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2009) 
pp. 142–160.
22 T. Ojanen, ‘From Constitutional Periphery toward the Center – transformation of Judicial 
Review in Finland’, 27:2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2009) p. 195.
23 Until 1979 judicial review was forbidden in Sweden (and very restricted until 2001), and 
in Denmark there is no mentioning of this role to the courts in the Constitution. Only 
once in 170 years has the Danish Supreme court set aside a piece of legislation adopted by 
the Danish Parliament. This was in the Tvind case handed down by the Danish Supreme 
Court on 19 February 1999 (U 1999.841 H). See J. Nergelius, ‘North and South: Can the Nor-
dic States and the European continent find each other in the constitutional area – or are 
they too different?’ in M. Scheinin (ed.), The Welfare State and Constitutionalism in the 
Nordic Countries, (Nordic Council of Ministers, Nord, Copenhagen, 2001); see also Wind, 
‘When Parliament Comes First: The Danish Concept of Democracy Meets the European 
Union’, 2 Nordic Journal of Human Rights (2009) pp. 272–289; Rytter and Wind, supra note 
8, pp. 470–504.
24 A similar distinction as the one presented by Dworkin is found in a more recent book by 
Richard Bellamy from 2007 who distinguishes between legal and political constitutional-
ism where he strongly defends political constitutionalism (i.e. majoritarian democracy). 
See R. Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
25 It is important to emphasise here that I am not claiming that constitutional or judicial 
review never takes place or is still forbidden. My point is merely – but never the less im-
portantly – that constitutional review is rarely practiced and considered problematic by 
politicians as well as the judges themselves.
26 R. Dworkin, Freedoms Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution (Harvard Uni-
versity Press, Cambridge, ma, 1996).
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making here, and have made elsewhere, is thus that the absence of a solid re-
view institution in these countries has significant repercussions, not just for 
the conception of democracy in these countries but also for their relation-
ship to supranational regulation in terms of international and European law.27 
This is not meant to imply that we are dealing with a static situation but, as 
Ran Hirschl has pointed out, the Scandinavian countries constitute in this re-
spect an unexplored laboratory of countries, which have deliberately rejected 
constitutionalism.28
While in previous research attention has been paid to the limited number 
of preliminary questions forwarded to the European Court of Justice from the 
Nordic states, explained in part by the lack of a solid judicial review tradition,29 
no attention has been given to the much broader debate of international law. 
We in fact have very little systematic knowledge about how, whether and to 
what degree the three Scandinavian countries have domesticated and ‘down-
loaded’ the international law treaties and ics’ case law that their governments 
have signed up to in their own national legal orders. The question could also 
be asked as McCrudden does in his article on national courts’ citation to the 
Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (cedaw). 
Do national judges primarily act as domestic actors “who use international law 
in order to advance domestic goals”?30
In the following I will take a closer look at the role citations and precedence 
play in national and in particular in international law. This part draws on re-
cent American political science research investigating the role of citations and 
precedence in international law. What this research demonstrates is that: how 
and whether judges cite international courts and conventions can be seen as 
a proxy for the acceptance and perceived legitimacy of the normative inter-
national judicial development since the Second World War. The link between 
citations to international courts and conventions and their perceived legiti-
macy will also be a central assumption in the present article where the Nordic 
countries are in focus.
27 Wind, supra note 8, pp. 1039–1063.
28 R. Hirschl, ‘The Nordic counter narrative: Democracy, human development, and judicial 
review’, 9:2 International Journal of Constitutional Law (2011) pp. 449–469.
29 See the author’s previous research which is also the subject of Ran Hirschl’s comment: 
Wind, ‘When Parliament Comes First’, supra note 8, pp. 1039–1063; Rytter and Wind, supra 
note 8, pp. 470–504.
30 C. McCrudden, ‘Why do National Court Judges Refer to Human Rights Treaties? A Com-
parative International Law analysis of cedaw’, Public and Legal Theory Research Papers, 
paper no. 482, 26 October 2015, online at <SSRN.COM/ABstract=2680458>, visited on 5 
July 2016.
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3 Citing International Cases and the Question of Legitimacy
It is sometimes argued that it is less problematic whether national judges cite 
the case law of those international courts that their government has signed up 
to as ic decisions are ‘one shot’ events that concern only the parties involved. 
As the International Court of Justice points out in Article 59 of its founding 
statute “[t]he decision of the Court has no binding force except between the 
parties and in respect of that particular case”.31 The dogma that international 
courts do not create precedent is however strongly contested as ics’ case law 
is increasingly cited, not only by the ics themselves but also by legal practitio-
ners, national courts and scholars.32 If we look at the European courts alone, 
both the ECtHR and the European Court of Justice (ecj) have already a long 
tradition for creating precedent through their case law. This also goes for more 
specialized courts. Krzyztof Pelc has put it more bluntly, referring to ics and 
international law in the following way “[b]inding precedent [in international 
law] may be a legal fiction, but it is one that courts and countries tacitly accept 
to be bound by”.33 Things are thus very different today, and it makes sense to 
say that judges in civil as well as common law systems34 cite previous cases 
from both the national and the international level to build a persuasive and 
legitimate argument. Doing so is, however, not only about persuasion and 
consistency. It is also about lending legitimacy to the cited court. Any specific 
reference may thus mirror the reputation of the specific court cited and its 
judges.35 Helfer and Slaughter also argue that courts “enhance each other’s 
prestige” by citing each other’s decisions.36
31 Statute of the International Court of Justice, online at <www.icj-cij.org/documents/ 
?p1=4&p2=2>, visited on 5 July 2016.
32 See also A.M. Slaughter, A New World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004); 
K. Alter, The New Terrain of International Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014).
33 K. Pelc, ‘The Politics of Precedent in International Law: A Social Network Application’. 
108:3 American Political Science Review (2014) pp. 547–564; see also A.-M. Slaughter, ‘A New 
World Order (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2004); K. Alter, The New Terrain of 
International Law (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2014).
34 There used to be a great divergence in the use of precedence between the two different 
types of legal systems. This is however no longer considered the case.
35 See W. Sandholtz, ‘How domestic courts use international law’, 38:2 Fordham International 
Law Journal (2015) pp. 596–536; C. McCrudden, ‘Why Do National Court Judges Refer to 
Human Rights Treaties? A Comparative International Law Analysis of cedaw’, Public and 
Legal Theory Research Papers, paper no. 482, 26 October 2015, online at <SSRN.COM/ 
ABstract=2680458>, visited on 5 July 2016.
36 L.R. Helfer and A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Toward a Theory of Effective Transnational Adjudication’, 
107 Yale Law Journal (1997) pp. 325–326; M. Wind, ‘Do Scandinavian judges care about 
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Lupu and Voten have shown that “judges cite precedent at least in part to 
provide strategic legitimation for their decisions”.37 In their very interesting 
study of the citation practice of the European Court of Human Rights, they 
moreover demonstrate that the court cites about ten of its own previous cas-
es in each new case.38 The fact that international courts cite their own cases 
tells us that precedence is important to ics themselves when trying to foster 
influence and establish a coherent, predictable and legitimate body of law. 
Since treaties and ic case law is also collected in large prestigious volumes 
and studied in law schools all over the world, one must assume not only that 
precedence plays an increasing role in modern international law, but also that 
national courts deciding international law related cases will take the case law 
into account and even cite it when appropriate. In particular, if the national 
judges come from countries with a solid international law tradition.
The Nordic countries and their national courts would most certainly be ex-
pected to belong to such a category and to be in the forefront when it comes 
to lending legitimacy to ics, treaties and conventions by citing them. How-
ever, as we are to see below, the number of treaties signed as well as the grow-
ing caseload from ics since the 1970s has gone more or less unnoticed by the 
Scandinavian judges.39 A liked and often used explanation (or even excuse) for 
this among Nordic lawyers has been the dualist approach to international law 
which has dominated all legal thinking in this part of the world for centuries.40 
Here decisions by ics (or international treaties) are not considered part of na-
tional law unless national legislative acts have turned them into legal sources 
in national law through legislation.41 Alf Ross (1899–1979), an internationally 
recognized Danish legal philosopher who was generally critical of internation-
al law due to its natural law origins, saw national law and international law as 
representing two irreconcilable legal realms.42 As a consequence,  international 
international law?’, in M. Wind (ed.), International Courts and Domestic Politics (Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge, forthcoming).
37 Y. Lupu and E. Voten, ‘Precedent in International Courts: A Network Analysis of Case Cita-
tions by the European Court of Human Rights’, 42 British Journal of Political Science (2011) 
p. 438.
38 Ibid.
39 Christoffersen and Rask Madsen, supra note 4, pp. 257–258.
40 O. Bing, ’Monism och dualism i går och i dag’, in R. Stern and I. Österdahl (eds.), Folkrätten 
i svensk rätt (Liber, Malmö, 2012).
41 H. Palmer Olsen, ’Præjudikatværdien af internationale domstoles afgørelser’, in J.H. Dan-
ielsen (ed.), Max Sørensen 100 år (Djøf, Copenhagen, 2013) p. 102.
42 See the analysis of Ross and international law in M. Wind, Sovereignty and European Inte-
gration: Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order (Palgrave, London, 2001), p. 9.
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law could never establish precedence in Danish law in its own right.43 You still 
find this point of view represented among Scandinavian judges and civil ser-
vants. However, in particular since the incorporation of the European Conven-
tion of Human rights into national law, the classical dualist conception has 
often been described as increasingly challenged. Not because politicians and 
judges suddenly changed their view on the requirement that the Convention 
could only have effect in national law when adopted through a legislative act 
in parliament (though only with ordinary and not constitutional law status), 
but probably more because the Strasbourg Court has been effective in clarify-
ing the Convention in its own case law and thus confronted the excuse used 
by many Nordic judges and politicians that the Convention was too unclear 
and unspecific to be applied by national courts. In Norway one thus gradually 
started talking about a new ‘semi-monism’ or ‘sector-monism’44 indicating – at 
least among international law friendly legal scholars – that international law 
and international decisions had or perhaps rather would gradually take over 
as the national source of law.45 In the late 1990s when all three Scandinavian 
countries were on board in the sense that they had all become firm partners 
of the European human rights regime, national judges could thus legitimate-
ly have used the Convention as well as the ECtHR’s case law as a source in 
their own cases. Things did not turn out to be that easy however. Counter to 
what one might have expected Scandinavian Supreme Courts have been very 
conservative and hesitant when it comes to taking this new instrument into 
use. In Denmark politicians even spelled out in their preparatory works to the 
43 H. Zahle, Dansk Forfatningsret 2: Regering, forvaltning og dom (Christian Eijler’s Forlag, 
Copenhagen, 2001) p. 211 refers to Alf Ross for this understanding. H. Palmer Olsen cites 
former Supreme Court judge Torben Jensen for the same point of view as Ross in an ar-
ticle from 1990. “Under the current legal state of affairs the European Convention of Hu-
man Rights and its decisions … is just as any other international regulation (apart from 
eu law) by the Human Rights Court non-binding in Denmark. In order to be so incorpora-
tion is necessary. The international law obligations deducible from the convention or the 
court will be irrelevant until this happens”. Author’s own translation from Danish.
44 In Danish legal theory, Professor Henrik Zahle called it ’practical monism’. See Zahle, ibid., 
p. 21.
45 See D.T. Björgvinsson, The Intersection of International Law and Domestic Law: A Theo-
retical and Practical Analysis (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2015); see also S.O. Johansen, 
Den internasjonale rettens påvirkning på norsk rett (The Effect of International Law on 
Norwegian Law) (6 February 2014), pacta nr. 23, available online on ssrn: <ssrn.com/
abstract=2391683>; J. Helgesen, Teorier om “Folkerettens stilling i norsk rett” (Oslo, 1982); 
and J. Helgesen’s chapter 12 on the role of international law in the domestic legal system 
in T. Eckhoff and J. Helgesen, Rettskildelære, 5. utgave (Universitetsforl., Oslo, 2001).
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 incorporation of the Convention that national courts should be careful not to 
independently develop the law on the basis of the Convention or the Stras-
bourg Court’s case law.46 One classical argument has as mentioned above been 
that conventions have been considered too broad and imprecise and thus unfit 
to be a serious source of law. However, if Supreme Courts (in agreement with 
politicians) initially abstained from relying on or even mentioning the Euro-
pean Human Rights Convention because it was too imprecise, this argument 
became obsolete as the ECtHR started clarifying the Convention’s provisions 
in its own case law in the 1980s and onwards, making the Convention judicia-
ble.47 As Palmer Olsen puts it with regard to the Danish courts: “International 
courts’ decisions – also those that do not concern Denmark specifically – … 
should thus gain precedence in Danish law to the degree these decisions are 
used as precedents by these international courts themselves”.48
This has however not happened. In fact, quite the contrary as we are to see 
below. The conception of international law as a foreign element and the clas-
sical scepticism towards strong courts and constitutionalism in general con-
tribute to a rather peculiar situation, where in particular Danish and Swedish 
judges – still – largely ignore international law. In the following the results of 
the data analysis will be presented together with some words about how the 
citations were collected. In the concluding section the findings will be debated 
and some tentative explanations as to why Scandinavian judges have never 
fully embraced the international courts and treaties that their governments 
have signed up to will be put forward.
4 Results and a Few Words on Methodology
Mattias Kumm once asked “[s]hould national courts in liberal constitutional 
democracies enforce international law even when there is no specific autho-
rization from the legislative or executive branches to do so?”49 The question 
is provocative because it questions the so-called internationalist approach to 
international law that “[n]ational courts should enforce international law, irre-
spective of national law”.50 But, according to Kumm, whether national courts 
actually play this role is an empirical and not a normative question. The main 
46 See also Rytter and Wind, supra note 8, pp. 470–504.
47 See Palmer Olsen, supra note 42, pp. 114–115.
48 Ibid., p. 106.
49 M. Kumm, ‘The International Rule of Law and the Limits of the Internationalist Model’, 
44:1 Virginia Journal of International Law (2003) p. 21 et seq.
50 Ibid.
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concern of this project is however not whether Scandinavian courts enforce 
international law, but rather whether they have deliberately domesticated and 
thereby legitimized it by citing it in their own case law. The project presented 
here however raises similar questions to those presented by Kumm about the 
interaction between the two legal spheres. It moves from normative assump-
tions about how things ought to be (and perhaps are assumed to be) to trying 
to understand to what degree Scandinavian judges in the Supreme Courts ac-
tually have embraced the treaties and conventions that Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway have signed up to since the 1950s.
Below the preliminary findings from a huge data set is presented. The data 
has been collected by a team of researchers at the Centre of Excellence for 
International Courts (iCourts) at the University of Copenhagen. In order to 
count the citations made by the Scandinavian Supreme Courts to ics’ case law, 
a comprehensive and original quantitative data set has been assembled from 
scratch. The goal has – as mentioned briefly already – been to count how many 
times the Supreme Courts in the three Scandinavian countries have cited an 
ic’s case law, a treaty or a convention in their own case law since the 1950s. The 
aim has been to be able to distinguish between the different courts, treaties 
and conventions, and thus determine exactly which specific court, treaty or 
convention was cited.51 Finally, to show developments over time, the date of 
the citation was coded for as well.
As the Scandinavian Supreme Courts have delivered thousands of judg-
ments since 1950, coding all the judgments manually would be extremely time-
consuming. To overcome this challenge, parts of the coding process had to be 
automatized based on innovative computer software. The automatic coding 
process has thus been an essential and innovative part of this project.52
51 The aim was as well to be able to determine whether it was the court, the parties or both 
the court and the parties to the case that made the citation in any given Supreme Court’s 
decision.
52 The first step in the automatized coding process was to create a codebook. A codebook 
is a detailed statement of instructions to coders on how to facilitate the coding. The 
codebook is a tool to increase the possibility of replicating the study in a reliable way 
at a later point in time. That is, different coders should be able to replicate the study 
and get the same results. This clearly adds to the quantitative methodology’s validity. 
There are many different ways in which to formulate a codebook. In this case the co-
debook  presents and describes all variables, and all the possible values these variables 
might take. It further presents the numbers (i.e. codes) that should be typed in the cod-
ing scheme given the different possible values of the variables. The complete codebook, 
“Codebook –  Scandinavian Supreme Courts’ citations to international courts” was devel-
oped by Kristoffer Schaldemose at iCourts in 2014.
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The citations by the national Supreme Courts to the ics were detected by 
using a method based on legal keywords. The relevant keywords were essential 
and not identical to the different variables in the codebook. In order to de-
tect all the citations made to, for example, the ECtHR in the Danish Supreme 
Court cases, all possible ways in which a particular national court refers to the 
ECtHR had to be included. Obviously it had to be taken into account that Su-
preme Courts do not cite the different courts in a uniform or standardised way. 
For instance, the Danish Supreme Court uses expressions such as ‘emk’, ‘Den 
Europæiske Menneskerettighedsdomstol’, ‘Domstolen i Strasbourg’ (the Court in 
Strasbourg). Consequently, detecting all the relevant keywords was a difficult 
task and had to be individualised from country to country. Through legal con-
sultancy and advice from experts the keywords were identified manually by 
coding a large sample of Supreme Court decisions. All the different expres-
sions used when citing the different ics, treaties or conventions were written 
down and this work continued until a reasonable amount of keywords for all 
the relevant ics had been identified. There is of course always the risk of cap-
turing so-called ‘false negatives’, meaning that your analysis may capture cita-
tions that cannot be regarded as a ‘true’ precedent in support of a previous 
case. It can be argued, however, that even citations that (explicitly) criticise the 
cases cited – what Fischman refers to a ‘negative references’– demonstrates 
the specific ic’s impact if not its perceived legitimacy. If a national court really 
perceives a given ic as illegitimate, why bother to cite case law from the ic at 
all? In other words, while ‘negative references’ might not be ‘true’ precedents, 
the project build on the notion that they certainly imply that the national 
court accepts the ic as a legitimate source of law.53
Based on the manually detected keywords, it was thus possible using a 
 specific computer software to search for and find these keywords, and hence 
automatically code the court decision or judgment. Variables such as date, id-
number and so on were also coded.54
53 See J. Fishman, ‘Reuniting “Is” and “Ought” in Empirical Legal Scholarship’, 162:1 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review (2013) pp. 117–168; R. Anderson, ‘Distinguishing Judges: An 
Empirical Ranking of Judicial Quality in the United States Courts of Appeal’, 76:315 Mis-
souri Law Review (2011) pp. 318–373.
54 Although a significant part of the coding process has been automatized, a considerable 
amount of manual test-coding has been necessary in order to increase the reliability in 
the study. In other words, the coding was constantly improved by adding new and im-
proved keywords, which optimised the computer script. The process is truly iterative: The 
keywords were detected manually and created a computer script, which then was used 
to code a random sample of court decisions. Thereafter, a random set of these court de-
cisions were coded manually and the findings compared with the automatized coding. 
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Fig. 2 presents the total number of citations to international courts made by 
Scandinavian Supreme Courts in their judgements and court decisions cov-
ering the time period 1961–2014. Although the present study only includes 
three countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) results of four Scandinavian 
Supreme Courts are included due to the fact that Sweden has two Supreme 
Courts: the ‘regular’ Supreme Court and the Administrative Supreme Court.
Fig. 2 clearly shows that the Norwegian Supreme Court refers much more 
frequently than both its Danish and Swedish counterparts, with 450 citations 
against 71 (dk) and 126 (the two Swedish courts put together). These findings 
support the hypothesis put forward in previous research that Norway with a 
strong national judicial review tradition will be more inclined to cite to in-
ternational courts than majoritarian democracies with no such tradition like 
Denmark and Sweden.55
Where Fig.  2 presented the number of citations to international courts, 
Fig. 3 focuses on the many international conventions and treaties that the Scan-
dinavian countries have signed up to. It is rather interesting (but perhaps not 
surprising) that the Scandinavian courts refer much more often to the con-
ventions and treaties than to international courts. While the Scandinavian 
This was done over and over again. Following this technique, errors can be found and 
corrected thereby improving the reliability of the study significantly.
55 See A. Kierulf, Taking Judicial Review Seriously: The Case of Norway (Oslo University Press, 
Oslo, 2014).
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Supreme Courts all together made 647 citations to international courts, they 
referred to conventions and treaties no less than 1756 times in the same period 
of time. This suggests that international law and treaties – which are based on 
‘legislation’ and thus explicit ‘government/parliamentary consent’ – are per-
ceived to be more legitimate than those international courts, which actually 
enforce international law.
As in the case of international courts, Norway is however also far ahead 
when it comes to making explicit citations to international conventions and 
treaties compared to its neighbouring countries. Norway thus run ahead with 
1285 citations in the period from 1961–2014 compared to 291 in Danish case law 
and 280 in Swedish case law.
The extensive data set takes all relevant international courts into consider-
ation. However, it is clear from Fig. 4 that only very few are considered relevant 
for the Nordic countries. In Norway, the ECtHR is clearly the most cited court. 
While the Danish and Swedish courts also cite ECtHR, they both cite the Euro-
pean Court of Justice more often.
While Norway generally cites international courts’ case law more frequently 
than Denmark and Sweden, both Denmark and Sweden cite the ecj more often 
than Norway, which is not a member of the eu. It is interesting, however, that the 
Norwegian Supreme Court actually does cite the ecj. This underscores of course 
that Norway is fundamentally penetrated by eu law although the European 
Free Trade Association (efta) court is the European Economic Area’s (eea) 
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own court (which normally sticks closely to the ecj’s legal practice). It  could 
be argued, that the ecj should not be part of this study at all as eu law no lon-
ger reasonably can be considered to be characterised as international law.56 
56 J.H.H. Weiler, ‘The Transformation of Europe’, 100:8 Yale Law Review (1991) pp. 2403–2483.
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It is moreover interesting that Scandinavian courts practically only cite two 
courts altogether: the ECtHR and the ecj – though Norway has also cited the icj 
and the efta court. No other courts are deemed relevant by the judges in the 
Scandinavian Supreme Courts.
Fig.  5 shows the number of citations by the four Scandinavian Supreme 
Courts to three selected courts and treaties, namely the echr, the ECtHR and 
the ecj. The graph is rather interesting as it clearly shows that the Norwegian 
Supreme Court use international human rights case law in its own cases much 
more often than its Scandinavian neighbours. The causes for this clearly need 
to be studied more qualitatively as well, but it does raise some interesting 
questions about potential differences in the levels of human rights protection 
in the Scandinavian countries. It also urges us to look more into: legal and po-
litical traditions, the dominance of Scandinavian legal positivism where inter-
national law in general plays a somewhat inferior role, legal teaching in the 
universities, and transparency in the judiciaries. I will not be able to go into 
any of these explanations in detail here, but only suggest two elements, which 
are important and closely linked: the missing judicial review tradition at the 
national level, and the dominant positivist approach to law in general in Scan-
dinavia, where statutes and preparatory works seem to be the most important 
sources of law for national judges.
5 Conclusions: Does the Influence of Legal Positivism and 
Majoritarian Democracy Explain Citation Frequency?
To what degree can legal traditions, ideas and visions about the role and sta-
tus  of international law in legal science explain the Scandinavian Supreme 
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Courts’ citation practice? Before we get too far down this ally it is probably 
 important to emphasise that how we think and traditionally have thought 
about the status of international law only partially explains the apparent am-
bivalence towards international law by the judges. However, when courts are 
hesitant to cite or rely on international legal sources, in particular courts’ case 
law and less so treaties adopted through legislative acts by the contracting par-
ties, this may – I will argue – have to do with the strong emphasis in this part 
of the world on legal statutes and the parliament as the prime lawmaker. The 
elevated position and role of the parliament vis-à-vis other branches of govern-
ment is clearly also important when trying to understand the special Nordic 
rejection (apart perhaps from Norway) of a solid judicial review tradition at 
the national level, which otherwise has been a global phenomenon the past 
25–40 years. Majoritarian democracy is and continues to be an almost indis-
putable value in the Scandinavian countries, also among judges themselves 
and the majority of professors who write the legal textbooks – though often 
only implicitly as they are only rarely explicit about their own conception of 
democracy.57
In line with my previous research on the ‘Reluctance towards supranational 
judicial review’ among the Nordics in the eu,58 the data collected here broad-
ens the perspective to encompass international law supporting the thesis put 
forward previously that the presence or absence of a solid judicial review tradi-
tion at the national level potentially has strong implications for the willingness 
of national judges to cite, domesticate and lend legitimacy to international law 
(in particular ics’ case law) in their own legal practice.
Closely linked to majoritarian democracy is the special version of Scandi-
navian legal positivism59 where positive law – seen as parliamentary statutes 
and legislative acts – are absolutely central. Courts play a very reticent role in 
political life in this part of the world at least when it comes to being active in 
57 We have conducted a systematic but not yet published analysis of the description of inter-
national law (compared to national law) in legal textbooks in the Scandinavian countries. 
We explicitly excluded text-books by international lawyers as they would obviously be 
biased and much more positive about international law than the average and thus only 
included those describing the legal field in general. See Wind, supra note 36.
58 Wind, supra note 8, pp. 1039–1063.
59 See J. Bjarup, ‘The Philosophy of Scandinavian Legal Realism’ 18:1 Ratio Juris (March 2005) 
pp. 1–15. It is here argued that (in order to destroy the distorting influence of values) one 
should destroy the metaphysics and normative aspects of legal and create a scientific 
theory of law. Central figures were Axel Hägerström and the Danish philosopher and legal 
scholar Alf Ross. They both focused on positive law as a system of rules in terms of behav-
ioural regularities among human beings. It builds on the idea of positive law as based on 
statutes and leaves very little room for the normativity of the law.
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striking down and scrutinising law-making.60 A survey from 2006 concluded 
that judges in Sweden and Denmark see themselves as closer to a ‘Bouches de la 
loi’-conception than as lawmakers, or active constitutional guardians, and that 
they felt quite comfortable with this.61
The legal text, as represented by statutes and other legislative documents, is 
thus the most important framework of interpretation for judges. Reliance on 
considerations other than the political intention of the legal provision is often 
(but not always) regarded as judicial policymaking, which judges ought to ab-
stain from as far as possible. This also explains why the travaux préparatoires 
become very central for the judges because they inform about the  intentions 
and the will of the legislature, and thus the political majority in parliament. 
Following former Professor J.P. Christensen – now a judge at the Danish Su-
preme Court – the understanding of the unconstrained legislature as the es-
sence of democracy can to a large degree be attributed to the Danish legal 
philosopher and legal positivist Alf Ross, an understanding which has domi-
nated law students in Copenhagen for generations.62 As Christensen puts it, 
“[f]or almost 40 years did this idea dominate the law faculty at the University 
of Copenhagen”.63 As he further puts it in a footnote: “Not until the 2nd edition 
of Henrik Zahle’s Dansk Forfatningsret from 1996 did anyone claim that the §3 
in the constitution limits the power of the legislator …”64
Alf Ross has played and continues to play a central role for many Scandi-
navians’ conception of international law. In particular Ross’ unease with in-
ternational law’s natural law origins has played a role. Though Ross has also 
been misinterpreted,65 he was very clear in his views about the different bases 
60 One way of putting it would be to say that in a positivist system of law, litigants or other 
legal actors would always know what the law is and thus not be surprised by an unwrit-
ten obligation or rule. Legal positivism in the Scandinavian version would also be very 
skeptical of judicial discretion. Legal positivism would expect judges to decide cases in 
accordance with the law (bouches de la loi), and not their personal preferences or moral 
considerations. See more in West’s Encyclopedia of American Law (2nd edition, The Gale 
Group, Inc., Farmington Hills, mi, 2008).
61 Wind, supra note 8, pp. 1039–1063.
62 See J.P. Christensen,’ Ross og statsforfatningsretten’, in Jakob von Holderstein Holtermann 
and Jesper Ryberg (eds.), Alf Ross. Kritiske gensyn (Djøf, Copenhagen, 2006). As he writes: 
“With Ross the division of power theory became a theory of the legislative branch’s all-
encompassing power. For almost 40 years this doctrine dominated the legal studies pro-
gramme at the University of Copenhagen”, p. 81, the author’s translation from Danish.
63 Ibid., p. 81, my translation from Danish.
64 Ibid., p. 103, my translation from Danish.
65 UdgivetJ. Holtermann, ‘Naturalizing Alf Ross’s Legal Realism: A Philosophical Reconstruc-
tion’, 24 Revus: Journal for Constitutional Theory and Philosophy of Law (2014) pp. 165 –186.
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for international law as opposed to national law and about the hierarchy of 
legal sources. Ross emphasised in his international law book from 1942 that the 
most valid sources of international law were positive sources like treaty and 
customary law.66 Common to these sources is that they are explicitly adopted 
by the states through legislation and practice, which is what defines them as 
‘positive’. Ross did not exclude more justice based sources but only acknowl-
edged them to the degree that they were actually referred to and used by states, 
legal practitioners and judges. The status and role of law is based on whether 
the law is in fact respected and not due to their natural law origins. As he puts 
it “[a] realist theory of legal sources builds on experience”.67 The emphasis on 
positive and customary law also underscores that treaties adopted by states 
are more important than court cases, but that court cases may be important 
if they actually create precedence and are looked upon as authoritative.68 The 
great scepticism against the natural law origins of international law is clear 
but also implies that human rights – and their natural law origins – were prob-
lematic for a Rossian type of Scandinavian realism, unless of course they were 
positivized in the sense of being put into treaties, customary law and adopted/
practiced by states. It is in other words clear that in Ross’ legal theory the state 
as a source of law plays an enormous role. Also in Sweden the legal positiv-
ism of Axel Hägerström (who strongly inspired the young Alf Ross) has been 
incredibly influential and often called the father of Scandinavian legal realism 
together with other Scandinavian scholars such as Herbert Tingsten and Karl 
Olivecrona.69 The fact that Hägerström, like his later followers, were critical 
of natural law, arguing that all law should be based on experience, may have 
influenced, although to a varying degree, legal education in the Nordic states. 
Perhaps this also made judges sceptical towards more normative international 
law sources. It is thus telling that at the Faculty of Law at the University of Co-
penhagen there is neither a professor of human rights nor of international law.
I fully recognise that it is difficult to verify how Scandinavian legal posi-
tivism/realism may have directly influenced Supreme Court judges’ citation 
practice. Much more research needs to be done in particular into how interna-
tional law is taught in Scandinavian universities – both within law and political 
66 A. Ross, International Law: An Introduction (Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag, 1984); Wind, 
Sovereignty and European Integration, supra note 43.
67 Ross, ibid., p. 110.
68 Ibid., p. 55.
69 J. Nergelius, ‘North and South: Can the Nordic States and the European Continent Find 
each other in the Constitutional arena – or are they too different?’, in M. Scheinin (ed.), 
The Welfare State and Constitutionalism in the Nordic Countries (Nord, Copenhagen, 2016) 
p. 81.
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 science. There is little doubt, however, that at least in Denmark and Sweden 
the division between positive/natural law rhetoric (law as morals vs law as 
facts) has had an impact on the way students, civil servants, politicians and 
judges have looked at international law and courts. It may thus also help us 
explain the weak domestication of international law among Supreme Court 
judges in Scandinavia.
